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A Taxonomy on Misbehaving Nodes in Delay
Tolerant Networks
Waqar Khalid, Zahid Ullah, Naveed Ahmed, Yue Cao, Muhammad Khalid, Haleem Farman, Muhammad Arshad,
and Haitham Cruickshank
Abstract
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are type of Intermittently Connected Networks (ICNs) featured by long delay, intermittent
connectivity, asymmetric data rates and high error rates. DTNs have been primarily developed for InterPlanetary Networks (IPNs),
however, have shown promising potential in challenged networks i.e. DakNet, ZebraNet, KioskNet and WiderNet. Due to unique
nature of intermittent connectivity and long delay, DTNs face challenges in routing, key management, privacy, fragmentation
and misbehaving nodes. Here, misbehaving nodes i.e. malicious and selfish nodes launch various attacks including flood, packet
drop and fake packets attack, inevitably overuse scarce resources (e.g., buffer and bandwidth) in DTNs. The focus of this survey
is on a review of misbehaving node attacks, and detection algorithms. We firstly classify various of attacks depending on the
type of misbehaving nodes. Then, detection algorithms for these misbehaving nodes are categorized depending on preventive and
detective based features. The panoramic view on misbehaving nodes and detection algorithms are further analyzed, evaluated
mathematically through a number of performance metrics. Future directions guiding this topic are also presented.
Index Terms
Delay Tolerant Networks, Flood Attack, Fake Packet Attack, Malicious Node, Misbehaving Node, Packet Drop Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are infrastructure-less networks, where no end-to-end route exists and disconnection
of network occurs frequently [1]–[7]. DTNs are primarily developed for Interplanetary Networks (IPNs) [8], however, also
applicable in emerging networks such as Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) [9], Underwater Wireless Sensor Networks
(UWSNs) [10] and disaster applications [11]. For example, some of these specific applications of DTNs are KioskNet [12],
DakNet [13], ZebraNet [14] and WiderNet [15]. Communication in DTNs follow a Store-Carry-Forward (SCF) method to
transfer messages among nodes [16]–[18], where the Bundle Protocol (BP) has the ability to reliably transfer a message both
hop-by-hop and end-to-end. The convergence layer translates a bundle to underline specific network architecture that enables
communication among heterogeneous networks [19], [20].
Due to intermittent connectivity, asymmetric data rate and long delay [21], DTNs face lot of challenges such as reliability
[22], [23], time synchronization [22], reorder of bundles, node management, spoof identity [24], resource scarcity [25], [26],
routing [27], [28], bundle security [29], [30], key management [31]–[34], fragmentation [35], [36], privacy [37]–[41] and
routing misbehavior [42] etc. Even though routing protocols in DTNs have been investigated extensively [43]–[54], inadequate
attention is paid to security issues in DTNs.
In DTNs, nodes are vulnerable to various attacks such as black hole [55], insider [56], gray hole [57], wormhole [58]–
[60], Denial Of Service (DOS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)/flood [61], faulty node [62], [63] and packet drop
[64]. Apart from the above-mentioned attacks, misbehaving nodes is one of the key challenging issues of DTNs. Misbehaving
malicious and selfish nodes introduce variously attacks (e.g. flood, packet drop and fake packet attack) to overuse scarce
network resources. Moreover, this would lead to nodes unavailability, low packet delivery ratio and bogus messages in DTNs.
However, the trivial mitigation algorithms in VANETs [65]–[69], Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) [70]–[73], Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) [74]–[77], TCP/IP [78]–[82] and UWSNs [83]–[86] are not applicable in DTNs, due to long delay
and frequent intermittent connectivity.
In [87], security issues in opportunistic networks are addressed, however with lack of details on flood and packet drop
attacks. A comprehensive survey on MANETs is presented in [88], however, the reviewed solutions are not applicable to
DTNs. In comparison, this survey discusses a Taxonomy of misbehaving nodes and detection algorithms in DTNs. Following
are the main contributions of this article:
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• A unique and diverse classification of misbehaving nodes in DTNs, based on different criteria such as the type of attack,
number of victim selections, internal and external nodes, intentional and un-intentional packets drop and individual and
social selfishness.
• Detailed classification of detection algorithms into eight different types, namely rate limit based, encounter based, watch-
dog based, guard-node based, incentive based, merkle-hash-tree based and protocol based detections.
• Rigorous analysis of various detection algorithms based on type of attacks, trusted authority (TA) and its role and mitigation
solutions.
• Mathematical evaluation of various detection algorithms, in terms of buffer consumption, cost and network performance.
• Presenting open research issues of misbehaving nodes detection and mitigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as. Section II provides various misbehaving nodes and its associated attacks. Section III
explains the detection techniques for misbehaving nodes. In Section IV, existing state-of-the-art protocols handling misbehaving
nodes are discussed. Section V is dedicated to analysis of detection techniques and related work using various parameters.
Section VI provides mathematical evaluation of detection schemes on certain parameters. Section VII discussed Use Cases.
Section VIII Describes Open Research Issues in the Subject area. Finally, the paper is concluded with future work in Section
IX.
II. MISBEHAVING NODES
Nodes in DTNs send packets based on the general assumption, that intermediate nodes will help to forward it. However, this
does not always work with security concern. To better understand the concept of various attacks introduced by misbehaving
malicious nodes, we consider four nodes A, B, C and D, as shown in Figure 1:
• In the first scenario, the source node A forwards a packet to destination node D, through the intermediate node B. While
node A is not directly connected to node D, thus it forwards a message to node B. At this stage, node A assumes that
node B will forward this packet to node D, whereas the latter drops that packet.
• In the second scenario in which node B generates flood attack to waste the limited resources of node C. For simplicity,
although we take one node as example but in reality, malicious nodes target more than one nodes to inject flood attacks.
• In the third scenario, node A forwards a message to node B that destined for node D. However, node B drops the packet
and injects a new fake packet to induce fake packet attack.
Here, all above scenarios present the misbehavior of nodes would affect overall network [89]–[113]. Figure 2 shows classification
of misbehaving nodes and its associated attacks, note that nodes inherently misbehave due to malicious and selfish nodes in
the network.
Fig. 1. Packet drop, Packet flood and Fake packet attack
A. Malicious Nodes
Nodes that injecting a large number of packets to overuse the resources of nodes in DTNs is called malicious nodes [114]–
[121]. Usually, the behaviour of malicious nodes is to inject more packets into the networks, but sometimes these nodes drop
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Fig. 2. Misbehaviour Attacks Taxonomy
packets to induce attacks. Malicious nodes launch DOS attack to waste resources and also disrupt the availability of nodes
[122]. Here, three different types of attacks that launched by malicious nodes are presented.
1) Packet Drop Attacks: Malicious nodes drop packets to trigger DOS attack [123]–[125], that leads to the decrease in
packet delivery ratio, and ultimately causes information loss. These malicious nodes normally drop the whole packet or part
of a packet, and we categorize packet drop attacks into further sub-categories:
a) Black Hole Attack: The malicious node drops all packets [126], [127].
b) Gray Hole Attack: The malicious node drops complete or part of the packet [57]. Furthermore, gray hole attack is
divided into the following sub-categories [78].
• Selective-Packet-Drop: The malicious node does not drop all packets but drops selective packets.
• Selective-Node-Packet-Drop: The compromised malicious node drops packets from selective nodes.
• Selective-Portion-Packet-Drop: The malicious node does not drop the whole packet, but drops some portions of packets,
such header information.
• Selective-Time-Packet-Drop: The malicious node drops the packet during a selective time.
c) Replay Attack: The malicious node which receives packets but forwards them with delay, is defined as replay attack.
2) Fake Packets Attack: In this attack, the malicious node sometimes drops legitimate packets and injects bogus packets.
3) Flood Attack: In flood attack, malicious nodes transfer as many bundles as possible to consume nodal resources (e.g.
buffer and bandwidth) [128]–[132]. Whenever malicious nodes inject a large number of packets in the network, this causes
resources consumption, losses legitimate messages and creates unavailability problems. We further classify the flood attack
into the following two sub-classes:
a) Request-Flood: In this attack, malicious nodes establish communication session with server or another node. In
traditional networks, a node sends HTTP request-packets to launch DOS attack to degrade server and work-stations resources.
Whereas in DTNs, there is no need of communication session establishment like TCP/IP based network. Therefore, the request-
packet flood is not effective in DTNs, due to lack of handshaking protocol in DTNs.
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b) Data-flood: The malicious nodes send a large number of data packets instead of solely request-packets. Inherently,
data-flood attack overwhelms the resources of DTNs nodes, most of the attackers used this strategy to launch flood attacks.
We herein categorize the data-flood attack into two major classes based on the malicious node strategy, which are packet-flood
and replica-flood attack [133], [134].
• Packet-flood: A malicious node sends a large number of unique packets to others, aiming to exhaust their buffer, also
known as breadth attack [135].
• Replica-flood: A malicious node injects replicas of the same message to waste resources (e.g. bandwidth and buffer), also
known as depth attack [135].
We have also classified packet-flood and replica-flood attacks into two further sub-categories based on the cryptography
information.
• External-node: The malicious node does not have valid cryptographic credentials, such as key and node Identity (NID),
is called external-node.
• Internal-node: Nodes which belong to the network having valid cryptographic key are internal-nodes. Internal malicious
nodes are further classified into the following sub-classes on the basis of victim selection.
– Single-Victim: When the malicious node selects a single node to forward messages and thus results in the overflow
of buffer and processing, the victim node becomes unavailable for other nodes due to opportunistic nature of DTNs.
This can be further classified into:
∗ Random-Node-Flood: The malicious node selects the victim randomly to launch flood attack in the network [134],
[136].
∗ Selective-Destination-Node-Flood: In this type of flood attack, the malicious node selects a designated node to
execute flood attack. Nodes having the highest participation in the relay process are targeted. Here, malicious
nodes explore the predictability property of nodes from the routing decision, e.g. decision based on predictability
in probabilistic routing protocol using history of encounter and transitivity (PROPHET) [137]. The active nodes
in the network are targeted by the malicious nodes [134] [136].
∗ Non-Existence-Destination-Node-Flood: In this attack, the fake message is created and forwarded to nodes that do
not exist in the network. As such, malicious nodes achieve their goal by wasting other nodal resources. It is worth
mentioning that the fake messages would remain in network until their Time To Live (TTL) expires [134] [136].
∗ Spoof-Node-Flood: In spoof flooding attack, malicious nodes spoof their identities to launch DOS based flood
attack [134], [136].
The flood attack can be further classified into following two categories, based on the protocol layer:
∗ Application-Level-Flood: These attacks target to overuse the resources of server such as CPU and socket [138]
[139].
∗ Network-Level-Flood/Transport-Level-Flood: Network-level-flood/Transport-level-flood attack [138] [139] is more
common in DTNs under which misbehaving nodes continuously flood packets to misuse the network resources
(e.g. bandwidth and buffer).
– Multiple-Victim: When the internal malicious node in DTNs selects multiple nodes to forward unwanted messages,
this is called Multiple-victim attack.
– Source + Victim: On the basis of source plus victim, the following four attacks are further classified:
∗ Single-Source-Single-Destination-Flood (SSSD): A single source node targets only one destination node.
∗ Single-Source-Multiple-Destination-Flood (SSMD): A single malicious node targets multiple destination nodes to
induce flood attacks.
∗ Multiple-Source-Single-Destination-Flood (MSSD): Multiple malicious source nodes target single destination node.
∗ Multiple-Source-Multiple-Destination-Flood (MSMD): Multiple source malicious nodes target multiple destination
nodes to overuse limited resources of legitimate node.
B. Selfish Nodes
Nodes that do not forward packets are defined as selfish nodes. There are many reasons of packet drops [140]–[150], that
are categorized into following two classes.
1) Intentional Packet Drop/Wicked-Selfish: Nodes with sufficient memory and forwarding power, but still drop packets
intentionally are defined as wicked-selfish nodes. We categorize intentional packet drop into two sub classes [151].
a) Receive-then-not-forward/Hypocritical-Selfish: Sometimes selfish nodes receive packets from forwarder node but silently
drop those packets, we call it hypocritical-selfish node.
b) Not-Receive/Deaf-Dumb-Selfish: Deaf-dumb-selfish nodes intentionally do not receive packet from the forwarder node,
in order to save its own resources. Such type of selfish node can be further categorized in to two sub classes, which are individual
and social selfish nodes [152], [153].
• Individual Selfish Nodes: It refers to node drop packets from all other nodes in a network.
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Fig. 3. Misbehaviour Nodes Detection Techniques Taxonomy
• Social Selfish Nodes: It refers to nodes belong to particular group and drop packets from other groups, however, does not
drop packets from its own group members.
2) Unintentional Packet Drop/Innocent selfish: This kind of packet drop can occur due to scarce resources. Unintentional
packet drop may also occurs due to software fault, broken node (hardware problem), forwarding power and memory overloading
[140], [154].
III. DETECTION TECHNIQUES
In this section, we discuss different detection techniques to cope with misbehaving nodes in DTNs. There are two basic
approaches, namely detective and preventive based solutions [155]. Figure 3 shows a summarized classification.
A. Rate Limit Based Detection
Nodes send request packets to Trusted Authority (TA) for getting the rate limit certificate (RLC). Here, TA issues RLC,
while forwarders send packets along with the RLC, to prove the behaviour of legitimate node. The number of packets can
be counted by source nodes, destination node and central authority. In DTNs, source nodes can easily count the number of
packets [133], however, it is difficult for destination node and central authorities to count packets due to lack of end-to-end
connectivity.
B. Encounter Based Detection
Encounter is defined as the contact of pairwise DTNs nodes. When encounter occurs, each node saves history in terms
of time, frequency, node id’s and sequence number of forwarding packets etc. Previous works have proposed detection and
mitigation algorithms to deal with node’s misbehavior pattern. We herein categorize them into two categories, which are
based on Encounter-History (Save nodes Contact information, that is id’s, sequence number of packets and frequency etc) and
Number-of-Encounter (number of encounter with every node). Based on these information researchers detect misbehaving nodes
(selfish node) which launches packet drop attacks. Furthermore, the Encounter-History based schemes has three sub-classes,
namely Sequence-Number, Time-Stamp and combination of time stamp and sequence number (Hybrid approach). Some of
the researchers used only sequence number of packet to detect selfish nodes. In some research articles, researchers used Time
stamp of encounter packets to cope misbehaving nodes. Some works proposed combination of above two method which is
hybrid approach to mitigate misbehaving nodes.
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C. Gateway-Node/Guard-Node Based Detection
The detection and mitigation carried out by the third party is called guard-node based detection. The following are the sub
categories.
1) Central-Gateway-Node/Central-Guard-Node Based Detection: In the Central-Gateway-Node detection, the detection and
mitigation is done through one centralized node (placed in specific position according to the requirements). Such central node
monitors all the traffic activities. Although the entire network traffic passes through the Central-Gateway-Node, this method is
ineffective in DTNs as the concept of centralize routing is infeasible.
2) Mobile-Gateway-Node/Mobile-Guard-Node Based Detection: In this type of detection scheme, the Mobile-Guard-Node
travels along the packet, to observe the behavior of others. However, this method is not that effective in DTNs, because there
is no end to end connectivity.
D. Watch-Dog Based Detection
In Watch-Dog based detection [156], each node keeps and eye on other node for packets received and forwarded. We have
categorized this type of detection into two further sub classes.
1) Watch-Neighbor Based Detection: In a Watch-Neighbor based detection, node directly watches their neighbors’ behavior
to check their selfishness.
2) Watch-Channel Based Detection: Here, node forwards message to intermediate nodes and keeps a copy of message in
buffer. It continuously checks the channel for overheads, thereby the case with no overhead means intermediate node is selfish.
E. Incentive Based Detection
In literature, few articles have proposed incentive based algorithms to tackle misbehaving nodes, especially selfish nodes in
DTNs [157], [158]. Generically, there are three types of incentive solutions named as reputation based, credit based and barter
based.
1) Reputation Based Detection: In Reputation based scheme researchers assign reputation (Threshold value/Reward value).
Reputation is increased when they forward packets and decreased when they drops packets to encourage misbehaving nodes to
participate in forwarding. Receiver always check reputation value before accepting and sender always check before forwarding
a packets. When a node reputation is below threshold value, receiver/sender not accept/not forward packets. The reputation
of node is calculated by two methods, either TA calculates nodes reputation or calculated from acknowledgement. The TA
gives reputation directly to the selfish nodes, to encourage selfish nodes to participate in forwarding process to enhance
network throughput and performance. In acknowledgement based reputation solutions, the reputation of a node is calculated
from acknowledgement (When they forward packets, node acknowledges which other nodes prove his innocent behavior)
of the intending receiver of the messages. Either increase or decrease of nodal reputation is used to handle misbehaving of
selfish nodes. The TA based reputation is further divided to two sub-classes that are Global-Reputation and Personalized-
Reputation [159]. In global-reputation solution, TA collects information from all nodes to calculate reputation. On the other
hand, in personalized-reputation, the information is collected from specific group members to calculate the reputation.
2) Credit Based Detection: Here, the misbehaving nodes which do not participate in the forwarding process [160], rather
forward packet with an encourage of credit/reward. The credit based detection is further categorized into three sub-classes,
which are as follows:
a) Message-Purse-Model Detection: When source nodes give credit to forwarding nodes, it is called Message-purse-model
[161].
b) Message-Trade-Model Detection: In Message-Trade-Model, a destination node gives credit to forwarding nodes [161].
c) TA-Trade-Model Detection: When a TA or other than source and destination nodes give credit to a node, we call it as
TA-Trade-Model. It improves the shortcomings of above two methods.
3) Barter Based Detection: Barter based detection is used to encourage nodes to participate in relay process. Barter based
are bargaining strategy (Nodes forward packets with condition). Here, an agreement is signed between nodes to overcome the
selfish behaviour, and various barter based algorithms have been proposed to thwart selfishness problems [162]–[165].
F. Merkle-Hash-Tree Based Detection
The Merkle-Hash-Tree is a complete binary tree of hashes. Hashes are calculated from left bottom to top (left leaf node
first then right leaf node and then root node). Popular hash algorithms such as SHA1 and SHA2 have been applied. The
Merkle-Hash-Tree based detection is also used to detect and mitigate malicious nodes [166]–[169], where a root hash value is
added to every packet to detect and mitigate misbehaved nodes.
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G. Protocol Based Detection
When some extra capability is plugged into an existing Bundle security protocol to detect and mitigate misbehaving nodes,
this article calls this Protocol Based Detection. Some authors proposed Protocol based detection for flood attacks. In protocol
based detection authors used Hash value, node id’s and signature along with Bundle Security protocol to mitigate malicious
nodes. According to our knowledge this method are cheapest to detect malicious nodes. However it only detect outsider node
(node do not have a valid cryptographic credential) and unable to detect insider node, which is down side.
H. Intrusion Detection Scheme (IDS) Based Detection
The IDS is a very powerful technique to detect and mitigate attacks in all types of networks [170]. Generically, there are
two types of IDSs, with agent based/software and hardware based features. The agent based detection is further classified into
two types, with the features of signature based and anomaly based. In signature based, data base of known attack signature is
created, which is used to compare for attack detection. In Anomaly based detection, attack is detected with malicious nodes
behavior.
Critical Analysis of Detection Techniques: Researchers proposed various method to detect and mitigate misbehaving nodes
which launches attacks. According to the critical analysis of this article, Some proposed detection techniques are very efficient to
detect malicious nodes. However, few proposed schemes are not efficient to mitigate malicious nodes due to challenging nature
of DTNs. Some proposed detection techniques are applicable in constraint environment (Guard-Node, Watch-Dog) or used for
specific misbehaving attacks (Flood or Packet drop or Fake packet) detection (Incentive based, Merkle hash tree based, Rate
limit based, Encounter based). Few proposed detection techniques detect malicious nodes, Nonetheless it required extra node
for detection (Gate-Way-Node). Some detection methods detect malicious nodes by forwarding extra information along with
packets (Rate limit base, Encounter based), which consumed resources. Some of detection techniques are centralized (which
need one node for detection) like Central-Guard-Node and Mobile-Guard-Node. On the other hand few proposed methods
are distributed (detection is distributed among node) like Rate limit based and encounter based algorithms. Fewer proposed
methods used TA in mitigation process which improve false positive and false negative ratios.
According to the analysis of this article Rate limit based and Encounter based algorithm are best suitable relative to other
methods to detect flood and packet drop attack. Because both schemes are distributed and have TA, which are suitable for
DTNs. Rate limit based algorithms detect malicious nodes which launches flood attacks. Encounter based algorithms detect
misbehaving nodes which launches flood and packet drop attacks. The down side of Rate limit based algorithm is high detection
time. Because it used cross checking strategy to detect malicious nodes. In DTNs nodes are not always connected. Detection
are not possible until encounter of other nodes, which share information. Which obviously take time, so resources consumption
are high in Rate limit based algorithms. Rate limit based algorithm are useful an environment in which encounter opportunity
are high.
The down side of Encounter based algorithms is storing and sharing of encounter history with other nodes. Which consumed
buffer and like Rate limit based it always need connected environment, but in DTNs it is not possible always. Also sharing of
extra information along with packets in detection is biggest problem in encounter based algorithms. Which consumed limited
resources of DTNs. Due to resources consumption packet delivery ratios are decreased and packet loss ratios are increased.
Which will be discussed in more detail in mathematical and simulation section of this article. According to analysis of this
article, if extra information is completely remove or compress, it will improve delivery ratios and packet loss ratios problems.
Guard-Node based detection method is not very suitable in DTNs. Because in Central-Guard-Node every packet is passed
through Central-Guard-Node. And Mobile-Guard-Node one specific node travel along every packets. The deployment of both
cases in DTNs are very difficult due to disconnected nature of DTNs. The remedy for this problem is distributed algorithms,
in which more than one node is responsible for mitigation.
Incentive based algorithms are not bad option to detect misbehaving nodes which launches only packet drop attacks. There
are three categories which are already mentioned in this article. Reputation based algorithms are very efficient to mitigate
malicious nodes which launches packet drop attacks. The down side of Reputation based incentive algorithms is calculation
(Either TA give reputation, or calculated from acknowledgment). Which is costly and may have high ratio of false positive and
false negative. If TA calculate reputation it will keep track of all networks, which is very difficult. On the other hand when
reputation is calculated from acknowledgment, it always required connected environment like TCP/IP base networks.
Credit based incentive algorithm are also good approach. However, Credit based algorithm only motivate those selfish nodes
which not take in forwarding process (save own’s resources). The down side of Credit based algorithm is complex calculation
and distribution of credit. There two method for credit distribution Message-Purse-Model (In which source give credit) and
Message-Trad-Model (In which destination give credit). In both cases false positive and false negative ratio is high. This article
proposed TA-Trad-Model (In which other than source and destination give credit) which overcome the shortcoming of above
mentioned both methods.
Barter based incentive is not suitable in DTNs. Because in Barter based algorithm agreement is sign between nodes for
forwarding each other packets. Which always need connected environment between all nodes. Barter based is very difficult to
deployed in DTNs.
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Merkle-Hash-Tree based algorithm are useful to detect malicious nodes which launches fake packet attacks. The down side
of Merkle based algorithms is complex calculation of Hash tree in sender side and verification in receiver side. Which is costly
in term of buffer, bandwidth, battery and processing usage. Also Merkle-Hash-Tree scheme have high false positive and false
negative value. Because in proposed algorithms only black list previous nodes in forwarding, which may not malicious. Which
is very big issue in Merkle-Hash-Tree based algorithms. Also the other downside of Merkle-Hash-Tree based algorithms is
only detection of fake packets. However, some malicious nodes launches packet drop attacks instead of fake packet attacks,
which is not detected by proposed algorithms. in future we will proposed algorithm for fake packet and packet drop attacks
which overcome false positive and false negative ratio.
Protocol based algorithm is fair idea to detect malicious nodes which launches flood attacks. But according to our knowledge
it only detect outsider malicious nodes. If some extra capability is plug-in an existing Bundle Security Protocol to detect insider
attacker. Which will be most efficient and cheap method for misbehaving nodes which launches flood attacks.
According to our knowledge IDS based scheme is not proposed for detection of flood attacks in DTNs. IDS based scheme
is fair idea (not complex calculation, distributed, easily deploy and suitable in challenging environment of DTNs) according
to our analysis to mitigate malicious nodes which launches flood attacks.
Apart from the above some analysis this article will further analyzed detection techniques with various proposed parameters
rigorously in analysis section of this article.
IV. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The misbehaving nodes are catastrophic for DTNs, as they often waste the important and limited network resources. In [136],
a queuing mechanism (distributed buffer management scheme) has been proposed. Here, when a node encounters infrequently
and forwards more messages, it is indicated as malicious behavior of a node. As such, less buffer space is allocated to all the
suspicious nodes, and more buffer space is allocated to frequently encounter nodes.
Although this is very good scheme for detection of malicious nodes which launch flood attack, this scheme works only for
probabilistic routing protocol PROPHET [137]. If a node encounters infrequently we can not assume that it is malicious because
of the sparse nature of DTNs nodes. In [135], a Gateway-Node to detect and mitigate a flood attack in DTNs is proposed.
In this scheme, all the nodes that upload or download bundles, share their buffer status to gateway-node. The Gateway-Node
has a data structure, while saves a number of different packets and replica count of nodes. If a node forwards more than
allowed number of messages, the Gateway-Node detects it as resource misuse attack. Probabilistic detection techniques for
depth attacks have also been proposed to enhance detection time.
In [133], rate limit technique is used to detect and mitigate flood attack. Here, all nodes in network send/forward request
for the rate limit certificate to TA. The TA gives rate limit certificate to nodes according to the their requirement. Every node
creates a P-claim (packet count claim in current time with a signature) and T-claim (count claim in current time and how many
times they forward copy of the packet claim), and sends it along with a packet. Nodes in network cross-check P-claim and
T-claim. If there is any inconsistency (nodes find malicious according to pigeon hole principle), the source node is listed as an
attacker node. Note that, the cross checking is very difficult in DTNs scenario, as it does not detect the malicious nodes until
other node cross checks. The work in [171] enhances that in [133] to add learning automata algorithm, to approximate count
packets. In [172], the method is quite similar to [133], to detect and mitigate flood attacks. Authors in [173], also propose a
scheme almost having a similar functionality as [133], but it adds crypto key with the existence scheme, by using advance
encryption standard (AES) algorithm.
In [174], it uses claim-carry-check method to detect flood attack in DTNs. In [138], the proposed system similar is to [133],
which detects both application level and network-level flood attacks in DTNs. The authors have proposed rate limit technique
to detect flood attack, which uses cross checking method for inconsistent claim made by the malicious nodes. In [175], the
scheme uses rate limiting technique to thwart a flood attack. While, [176] propose a rate limit algorithm using RSA to find
exact malicious attackers. The work in [177] mitigates packet flood and replica flood attacks.
Researchers in [178] use three different types of DTNs cookies (hash value of time-stamp, source-id, random-number). The
first type of cookie is made from concatenation of time-stamp, source-id and Random-number. The second and third type of
DTNs cookie use XOR operation and HMAC for more randomness. The cookie verification finds malicious nodes and then
blacklists those nodes that launch flood attacks, whereas this stops only outsider malicious nodes (a malicious node which not
have valid cryptographic credentials).
In [179], the proposed reputation solution assumes that there is TA in the network. Malicious nodes flood network with
bogus messages, but cannot create genuine messages. Initially, each node in the network creates a message and forwards it
to TA. The TA gives reputation based on genuine message. If the reputation of a node is greater than or equal to predefined
threshold value, the node will accept message otherwise reject. Some questions are left behind by this mechanism, like what
is the criteria for genuine messages? Why malicious nodes does not create genuine messages? How TA recognized genuine
messages and bogus messages? The proposed algorithm is suitable only for ideal environment.
In [180], author propose a piggyback scheme to detect multiple attacks associated to black hole, gray hole and flood attack
in DTNs. The encounter record scheme with rate limit is used to detect multiple attacks. Malicious nodes have two choices that
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to either change the time-stamp or alter the sequence-number of encounter records. This algorithm easily detects misbehaving
malicious nodes, but the downside of this algorithm is detection time and cost. However, it detects malicious nodes only if
other nodes would share encounter, and that is not suitable in DTNs.
In [181], a stream-node is designed to monitor the network. The Stream-Node contains three tables which are rate-limit table,
Dpt-tab (delivery probability table) and B-list (black list) table. The Stream-Node compares the actual delivery probability with
an estimated delivery probability. If the difference is greater than pre-defined threshold value, the stream-node detects it as
malicious and blacklists that node.
The work in [182] propose probabilistic misbehaving node detection scheme (PMDS) to detect and mitigate malicious node
in DTNs. This algorithm consists of event generation and auditing phases. In the event generation phase, events related to
delegation, contact and forwarding of every node are recorded. In the auditing phase, the TA collects all event generation
information from different nodes, to check if that node is malicious or not. For efficiency and performance, the TA checks
nodes with low reputation frequently and that with higher reputation infrequently. Although this is very efficient algorithms to
detect malicious node, it is expensive and not suitable for DTNs.
In [183], [184], an observer node monitors all network for selfish nodes. The proposed algorithm assumes that observer
node has all public keys of every node. However, observation based detection is very difficult to implement in practical DTNs
environment, due to sparse and disconnected nature of DTNs nodes.
In [42], the proposed scheme mitigates packet dropping attacks in DTNs, using contact history based detection. In this
algorithm, every node saves its previous contact history, and shares its contact history information with others to detect
misbehaving nodes. The proposed algorithm detects inconsistency and misreporting, either in sequence-number and time-stamp.
Here, every node keeps contact history information that is down side of algorithm, due to limited resources and opportunistic
feature in DTNs.
The credit based schemes proposed in [160] and [185] detect misbehaving nodes through Offline Security Manager (OSM)
and Virtue Bank (VB). The OSM is responsible for issuing a certificate to a node and VB is for distribution of credit among
nodes. If a node forwards a data to intermediate node, the source node must make a base-layer including nodes IDs, class of
service, agreement policy, TTL, time-stamp, certificate, source signature and next forwarder node ID. Intermediate node makes
a multiple endorse-layers (Base-layer with digital signature), when the packet is successfully transferred to the destination,
destination nodes collect information from all layers and forward it to the VB. The VB calculates and shares a credit among all
the participating nodes in relay process. This scheme is prone to processing cost and bandwidth consumption, thus is inefficient
in DTNs.
In [126], the proposed algorithm enables all nodes to make packet sending list and receiving list, which is updated directly
or indirectly. The work in [154] uses channel sensing mechanism of Watch-dog schemes to detect misbehaving nodes. When a
source node forwards a packet to intermediate node, it keeps the original message in its buffer. The source node continuously
monitors the channel. If intermediate node sends a packet to destination so source compares the overhead of channel to its
buffer. If match then node is not malicious otherwise source detect the intermediate node is malicious. But there is possibility
that intermediate node drop a packet and sends its own packet. Also there is probability that other node send a messages so
there is overhead in channel. The source assume that node is not malicious but in reality the node is malicious. The false
positive and false negative is very high in this particular detection scheme.
The work in [159] mitigate two type of malicious attacks. That is Bad-mounting (when a Rater decreases the reputation of
service provider) and Ballot-stuffing (when a Rater increase the reputation of service provider from low to high). The authors
derive a formula for global reputation and inconsistency. The proposed algorithm compare inconsistency value and threshold
value. If inconsistency value become less than threshold value, node is not malicious, otherwise malicious. Reputation and
trust based scheme are not effective in DTNs due to unique nature of DTNs. The ratio of false positive and false negative is
high in this particular algorithm.
The proposed work in [186] improved the research of [159] by categorizing a Rater (R) based on the rating to service
provider (SP) with low, middle and high priority cluster. This gives a second chance for node to prove that they are not
malicious unlike existing iterative trust and reputation management system (ITRM) [159]. The Proposed algorithm have low
false positive as compare to ITRM scheme and complexity is linear to cluster unlike existing ITRM that is linear to nodes. In
[168] proposed a Merkle-Hash-Tree and trust value to detect and mitigate a selective packet dropping attack in Opportunistic
Networks (OppNets) a type of DTNs. It calculates root hash and then append with every packet. Destination node checks, if
hash is not verified, thus decrease the trust value of previous node path. In case of multi hop it decrease the trust value of all
nodes in the path that may include some legitimate nodes. The false positive and false negative is high in proposed algorithms.
Researchers in [187] proposed an algorithm to detect misbehaving malicious nodes that launch a packet dropping attacks
in DTNs. It detects the packet dropping attack by examining the header field which is called indicative field. Indicative field
are further divided into three sub field, identification field, flag field and offset field. This is very good scheme but the main
problem of this algorithm is cost and the ratio of false positive and negative.
Researchers in articles [188]–[191] discussed different incentive based, reputation based and game based schemes to cope
selfish node in DTNs which is responsible for packet drop. The authors also analyzed the impact of selfish nodes on packet
delivery ratio in DTNs. The paper [192] proposed collaborative trust management system which is actually Watch-dog based
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system to detect malicious node in post disaster scenario. Watch-Dog based system is not very effective in DTNs due to high
ratio of false positive. In [193] the proposed Global reputation estimation and analysis technique (GREAT) that is distributed
reputation scheme without trusted authority to detect malicious and selfish node in post disaster environment. The proposed
scheme detect packet drop, Ballot-stuffing and bad-mounting attacks in DTNs. This work has no involvement of TA and
complexity of reputation estimation makes it in-feasible for DTNs.
In [194] the authors proposed a scheme for detection of malicious nodes which drop packets and include a new fake packets
in OppNets. The authors proposed a packet creation time to detect attacks. Destination node check the creation time of packet
if same or nearly same, algorithm assume node is not malicious otherwise malicious. The proposed scheme is efficient but if
malicious node create a packet with legitimate time, then non detectable. Researchers in article [195] proposed the combination
of reputation and trust based algorithms to detect malicious path and malicious node in OppNets. The proposed algorithms
detect malicious node by using Merkle-Hash-Tree and reputation. In this scheme researchers calculated hash value of every
packets. Destination node compare hashes with number of packets. If number of packet is equal to hashes so algorithm assume
the node is not malicious. The main problems of this algorithm are cost and lack of TA that leads to more ratio of false positive
and false negative. Also the researcher assume that one packet must be reach to destination. But if malicious node drop all
packet so algorithm fail.
The authors in [167], [169], [196] propose a Merkle-Hash-Tree to detect a malicious nodes which drop packet and add fake
packets. It calculates root hash, and then appends it with every packets. The destination node recalculates hash, if that matches
with attached hash then no attack is detected. In case of multi hop case, the proposed scheme detects only the last node which
may or may not malicious.
V. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes and summarizes the related work and detection techniques based on our proposed parameters.
Misbehaving selfish and malicious nodes launch various attacks such as packet flood, packet drop and fake packet. Related
work above three attacks are summarized in Tables I, II and III respectively. The following parameters were used to analyze
and evaluate the related work.
• Approach: This parameter indicates the type of algorithm used i.e. detective or preventive.
• Detection method: There are two methods to deal with misbehaving nodes i.e. probabilistic and deterministic.
• TA: Existence and nonexistence of TA and its repercussions.
• Detection mechanism: The complexity of detection algorithm.
• Scheme: Centralized and Distributed detection.
• Detection criteria: Various detection criteria and its impact.
• Mitigation: Efficiency of mitigation algorithms to save scarce resources.
• Action by: In case of detection, the target node or TA or the designated node can take the mitigation action.
• Type of attack: Malicious nodes usually launch flood, fake packet attack and sometimes packet drop attack. On the other
hand, selfish nodes launch packet drop attack usually.
• Problem: Shortcomings of the techniques described in literature.
• Additional feature: Enlist additional features.
The fake packet attacks are summarized in Table I except [187] and [168] that detect selective packet drop attacks. The
techniques are mainly based on packet creation time, trust and Merkle-Hash-Tree. Among these three techniques, Merkle-
hash-Tree based is relatively efficient to detect malicious nodes. However, Merkle-Hash-Tree incurs additional cost for hash
calculation and verification. Due to the scarce resources in DTNs, there is need of an efficient and low cost technique.
All techniques detect only malicious node except [180] that detects both malicious and selfish node summarized in Table
II. Moreover, all techniques detect flood attacks except [180], that detects multiple attacks such as flood, black hole and gray
hole. Furthermore, all discussed algorithms blacklist the malicious nodes except in [136], which allocates less buffer space
to malicious nodes. Most of the researchers have proposed rate limit based algorithms for detecting malicious nodes, that
are effective in DTNs. Because rate limit based algorithms are distributed in nature, the TA based algorithms have minimum
issues of false positive and false negative. Some of the works proposed Watch-Dog, Guard-Node and encounter based schemes,
however they are costly and not suitable for DTNs. According to observations, low cost and distributed algorithms are required
to detect malicious nodes in DTNs.
In literature, various algorithms have been proposed on selfish nodes summarized in Table III. Mostly, techniques are based
on incentive solution to counter misbehaving nodes. In literature, many other schemes were proposed such as Watch-Dog
based, credit-based and reputation based incentive schemes. We concluded that reputation based algorithms are costly and
difficult to deploy in DTNs. However, reputation based algorithm is better compared to watch-dog based and Credit-Based.
The Credit-Based scheme fails in situation where network have large number of misbehaving nodes.
Table IV analyze detection technique categories based on our proposed parameters which are:
• Applicability To DTNs: This is very an important parameter because some proposed algorithms are not suitable for
DTNs. This article consider three levels for applicability that is High, Low and Moderate.
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TABLE I
FAKE PACKET ATTACKS/MALICIOUS NODES
Article Detection cri-
teria
Detection
method
Mitigation Problems
[194] Packet
creation
time
Each node
add time to
packets
destination node
arrange packet if
creation time is not
same, node detects
malicious and black
list nodes
If Malicious node send
a packet with legitimate
time so what about this?
Algorithm detect only fake
packet not malicious nodes
[167],
[169],
[196]
Merkle-hash-
tree
Node add root
hash to each
packet
Destination node
calculates root hash
if match proceed
otherwise malicious.
Node black list all
nodes in the path.
If only one node in the
communication path is
malicious,that leads to
whole path malicious
[168] Merkle-hash-
tree, trust
value
Node add root
hash to each
packet
Algorithm calculates
the root hash if not
match so decrease
the trust value of
nodes in the path
by 0.1 if trust
value of the nodes
become less
than 0.2,
the node is declared
malicious.
The trust value of
honest node is
decrease if it belongs
to malicious path.
Detection of malicious
node below the
threshold value 0.2.
[187] Merkle-hash-
tree
Node add
special header
in the packets
Indicative filed
contains three
fields:
Identification, flag
and offset field.
Through identification
field node
find malicious
nodes
More false positive
and false negative
• Shortcoming: Various shortcomings in the literature schemes.
• Cost: Some of algorithms have very high cost due to deployment of extra node to detect malicious nodes. Some of the
proposed algorithms also need high processing both on sender and receiver side. Based on these observation this article
analyzes that:
Cost = Processing Cost + Extra Node Cost (1)
However, we only consider the cost of extra node and assume that processing cost is the same for all detection algorithms.
We take two levels for cost: high and Low, where for extra node the cost will be high.
• Buffer Consumption: Some of the proposed algorithms store history and other information in the buffer, thus overflows
buffer and decreases packet delivery ratio. We consider three levels for this, that are High, Medium and Low to analyze
the detection algorithms.
• Extra Node: Some of algorithms require extra node to identify malicious node.
• Detection Accuracy: Some of algorithms aim to tackle misbehaving nodes in DTNs. False positive and false negative
ratio are high, which is catastrophic for DTNs. Based on these observations this article consider three levels: Low, Average
and Good.
VI. MATHEMATICAL EVALUATION
This section analyzes the performance of above discussed algorithms in detail. The exact value of all constants and its relation
with parameters are out of the scope of this article. Also, exact dependency of parameters and its exact value is the future
work of this article. The Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) [197] is used for simulation that is specifically designed
for DTNs. The parameters considered are: number of nodes (50), nodes are mobile, simulation time (20000 sec), random way
point mobility model, wait time (120), TTL (300). This article used various routing protocol for simulation which is follow
as. Epidemic, Direct Delivery, SprayAndWait, Prophet and First Contact. This article used all mentioned routing protocol for
simulation. However, all protocol shows similar results, That is why for illustration results of some protocol are shown in
this article. For illustration Epidemic is evaluated for the impact of buffer with packet delivery and loss ratios. SprayAndWait
are used for impact of packet size, node speed and transmission range on packet delivery and packet loss ratios. Epidemic,
First Contact, Direct Delivery, SprayAndWait and Prophet are used for impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss
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TABLE II
FLOOD ATTACKS/MALICIOUS NODES
Article Approach Scheme Detection
method
TA TA Role Detection
Criteria
Detection
Mechanism Actionby
According
Figure 3 AdditionalFeature
[136] Detective Distributed Probabilistic - - Encounter Number OfEncounter By-Self EncounterBased
Buffer Man-
agement For-
mula
[135] Detective Centralized Deterministic
&
Probabilistic
- - Threshold Count NumberOf Packets
Gate-way
Node EncounterBased
Gate-way
[133] Detective Distributed Probabilistic + 1) RLC2) Black listing Rate-Limit
Claim-Carry-
check TA RateCertificate
Based
Aggregate
Signature
With
Merkle-
tree
[171] Detective Distributed Probabilistic + 1) RLC2) Black listing Rate-Limit
Claim-Carry-
Check TA RateCertificate
Based
Learning
Authomata
[172] Detective Distributed Probabilistic +
1) RLC
2) Black listing Rate-
Limit
Claim-Carry-
Check TA RateCertificate
Based
-
[173] Detective Distributed Probabilistic +
1) RLC
2) Black listing
3) Private Key
Rate-
Limit
Claim-Carry-
Check TA RateCertificate
With Key
Key
[174] Detective Distributed Probabilistic + 1) RLC2) Black listing Rate-Limit
Claim-Carry-
Check TA RateCertificate
Based
-
[138] Detective Distributed Probabilistic + 1) RLC2) Black listing
Rate-limit
And
Mysql/DNs
Claim-Carry-
Check TA Hybrid
MYSQL/DNS
For
Application
Level Flood
[175] Detective Distributed Probabilistic + 1) RLC Rate-limit Claim-Carry-Check TA RateCertificate
Based
-
[176] Detective Distributed Probabilistic +
1) RLC
2) Private Key
With RSA
3) Black listing
Rate-
Limit
Claim-Carry-
Check TA RateCertificate
With Key
Key
[177] Detective Distributed Probabilistic +
1) RLC
2) Private
Key With AES
3) Black listing
Rate-
Limit
Claim-Carry-
Check TA RateCertificate
With Key
Key
[20] Detective Distributed Deterministic -
Protocol
Based
Defense
DTNs Cookies
Security
Gate-way
Node
Protocol
Based
Cookies
[179] Preventive Distributed Deterministic + Reputation
Compare
Reputation
To threshold
Check Genuine
And Bogus
Messages
BY-
Self
Incentive -
[180] Detective Distributed Probabilistic + RLC
Rate-Limit
&
Encounter
Sequence
Number And
Time Stamp
TA Hybrid Piggybacking
[181] Detective Centralized Probabilistic + RLC Rate-Limit
Compare Actual
Delivery
Probability
With Estimated
Probability
Guard Rate Based Guard-node
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TABLE III
PACKET DROP ATTACKS/SELFISH NODES
Article Approach Scheme Detection
method
Detection
criteria
Detection
mechanism Mitigation
Detected
node
Detected
Attack Additional Feature
[182] Detective Distributed Probabilistic Reputation
Delegation,
Forwarding,
Contact
History Pass
to Algorithm
Black list
malicious
nodes
Selfish Packet drop
TA give
Reputation
& perform auditing
[183] Detective Centralized Probabilistic Reputation Check FTTand RTT
Broadcast
information
in the network
Selfish Packet drop Observer-node
[184] Detective Centralized Probabilistic Reputation Check FTTand RTT
Broadcast
information
in the
network
Selfish Packet drop Observer-node
[42] Detective Distributed Probabilistic Encounter
history
Sequence
number and
time stamp
Black list
malicious
nodes
Malicious Packet drop -
[160],
[185]
Detective
&
Preventive
Distributed Deterministic Credit-
based
Add one Base
Layer
And Multiple
Endorse Layer
Black list
Malicious
Nodes
Selfish Packet drop
Vitual bank
&
Offline Security
Manger
[154] Detective Distributed Probabilistic Watch-
dog
Channel
Sensing
Black list
malicious
nodes
Selfish Packet drop -
[159] Detective Distributed Probabilistic Reputation
Compare
Inconstancy
With Threshold
Black list
Malicious
nodes
Social selfish
Bad-mounting
&
Ballot Stuffing
-
[186] Detective Distributed Probabilistic Reputation
Compare
Reputation
Inconsistency
Black list
Malicious
Nodes
Social selfish
Bad-mounting
&
Ballot Stuffing
Clustering
Which Enhance
The Scheme
TABLE IV
ANALYSIS OF DETECTION TECHNIQUES
Category Applicability To DTN Shortcoming Extra Node Cost Detection Accuracy Buffer Consumption
Rate Based Moderate Cross-checking,Detection time Yes High Average Low
Encounter based Moderate Buffer-consumption,Detection time Yes/No High/Low Average High
watch-dog based Low Disconnected natureof DTN No Low Low Medium
Reputation based Moderate Collaboration ofSelfish nodes Yes/No High/Low Average High
Credit based Low
Scheme fail due to
High percentage of
Misbehavior nodes
Yes High Average Medium
Barter based Low
If node have not a
packet to sent scheme
fail
No Low Low Low
Merkle-hash-tree based Moderate Detection time andCost No Low Average Medium
Guard-node based Low Disconnected natureof DTN, Cost Yes High Good Low
ratio. Table V summarized all parameters and its symbol used in mathematical section. Table VI is Variable stat table, which
summarized stat (Independent Variable or Dependent Variable) of variable used in mathematical section.
Performance: Performance is relative parameter which depends on multiple factors, which is represented by Performance-
A, Performance-B and Performance-C. There are three arbitrary independent ways to measure Performance according to
the analysis of this article, which is represented by Performance-A, Performance-B and Performance-C. There are various
parameters which have some certain impacts on the value of Performance. That is why this article classify Performance
measurement into three different categories. That is A, B and C. A class depends on applicability (discussed in next paragraph)
and buffer consumption broadly. That is Performance is calculated from applicability and buffer consumption. Applicability
and Buffer consumption further depends on various parameters, this article discussed all those in detail in next subsequent
paragraphs. B class depends on detection accuracy of algorithms, this article calculate Performance from detection accuracy
of algorithms (Detection accuracy depends on other parameters, this article discussed all those parameters in subsequent
paragraphs). C class depends on cost that is Performance is calculated from cost. Cost of algorithms are divided into two
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TABLE V
PARAMETERS SYMBOL LIST
Parameter Symbol Description Parameter Symbol Description
Applicability AP
AP is very important parameter
to evaluate Algorithm in DTNs.
Some of the proposed algorithm
are not applicable in DTNs because
it consumed more buffer space,
processing and high cost due to extra
node (Guard-Node based).
Resources are scarce in DTNs.
AP is related to AD and BS.
Buffer Consumption BC
Performance is inversely
related to BC. Some proposed
algorithm are efficient to
mitigate malicious nodes.
However it consumed more
buffer which cause DR
and PL problems in DTNs
Buffer Size BS
BS is important because due to
misbehaving attacks buffer are
consumed. Which cause delivery
ratio and packet loss ratio problems.
DR are directly proportional to BS.
Algorithm Design AD
Performance of algorithm
depends on AD. AD is related
to Time complexity and Space
complexity of algorithms.
Packet Delivery Ratio DR
It is ratio between Delivered packets
to total created packets.
Due to misbehaving attacks DR are
decreased. The goal of intruder in
DTNs to decreased DR.
Transmission Speed TS NE are increased with TS, whichultimately enhance DR.
Packet Loss Ratio PL
It is the total drops packets in simulation.
Due to misbehaving attacks PL is
increased. The objective of malicious
nodes in DTNs to increased PL.
Transmission Range TR
TR is directly related to NE,
when NE are high so DR will
be high and packet loss ratio
will be low.
Packet Size PS
Due to large packet size buffer are
consumed which cause DR and PL
Problems. Some proposed mitigation
algorithm forward extra information
(Encounter based) along with packets,
which ultimately cause DR and PL
problems in DTNs
Wait Time WT
WT is idle time after one
packet is forward.
WT is inversely related to NE.
NE enhance delivery ratios
and packet loss ratios.
Number of Encounter NE
NE is the meeting (Contact) between
nodes. NE is directly proportional
to DR. NE is increased with TS,
TR and WT.
Detection Accuracy DA
The ratio of false positive
and false negative indicate
DA. Some proposed
algorithms have high DA,
however few have low DA.
Number of Nodes NNodes
NNodes is directly related to DA.
Rate limit based and encounter
based algorithm detect malicious
nodes with cross checking.
If number of nodes are high so
probability of detection
will be high.
Inter Contact Time ICT
ICT is the meeting time
between nodes. If nodes
meet frequently so detection
probability will be high. Because
some (Rate limit based)
proposed algorithm detect
malicious nodes with cross
checking or encounter strategies.
DA is inversely related to ICT.
TABLE VI
VARIABLE STAT TABLE
Equation Number Independent Variable Dependent Variable Equation Number Independent Variable Dependent Variable
3 BS DR, PL 9 WT DR
4 PS DR, PL 10 WT PL
5 NE DR, PL 14 NNodes, ICT DA
6 TS NE, DR, PL 19 DP, CP PDR
7 TR NE, DR, PL 20 DP, CP PLR
8 WT NE 24 TB, UB BC
categories that is processing cost and extra node cost (discussed in subsequent paragraphs of this section).
Performance of detection algorithms is directly proportional to Applicability (AP) and inversely to Buffer Consumption (BC).
AP is related to algorithm design (Time Complexity and Space Complexity) and Buffer Size (BS). To meet the challenges in
DTNs, efficient algorithms are required that have minimum buffer requirements.
Performance-A = (AP ∗ K1)/BC (2)
Where K1 is the constant of proportionality, which depends on multiple parameters e.g., cost, processing power, detection
accuracy and processing time. K1 is the relative constant which is the ratio between performance times buffer consumption
to applicability. Moreover, applicability is directly related to algorithms design (time complexity and space complexity). On
the other hand, the delivery and Packet Loss (PL) ratios are related to Buffer Size (BS). If buffer size is increased, Delivery
Ratio (DR) also increases [198]. Whereas if buffer size is increased, packet loss ratio is decreased.
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BS = (DR ∗ K2)/PL (3)
Where K2 is constant that depends on multiple factors such as buffer capacity, processing power and connectivity. From the
above equation, the delivery ratio is increased with buffer size. While the packet loss ratio is decreased with buffer size up
to some certain limit (depending on the value of K2). Fig 4 shows simulation results of packet delivery and loss ratios with
buffer size.
Packet delivery ratio and packet loss ratio are related to packet size as well. Delivery ratio is decreased with increased in
packet size, and packet loss ratio is increased with increase in packet size [199], as shown in Fig 5.
Packet Size (PS) = C1 ∗ (PL/DR) (4)
Where C1 is constant of Proportionality, which depends on buffer size and node encounter (connectivity). Moreover, DR is
related to number of encounters. The packet delivery ratio increases with number of encounters, while packet loss ratio is
decreased. However, the encounter depends on transmission range and transmission speed.
Fig. 4. Impact of buffer size on packet delivery and packet loss ratio
Fig. 5. Impact of packet size on packet delivery and loss ratios
Number of Encounters (NE) = C2 ∗ (DR/PL) (5)
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Where C2 is constant which depends on buffer capacity. Eq. 5 implies DR is increased with NE upto certain limit, which
depends on buffer capacity. If node buffer is full it means capacity is zero so DR will not increased. NE is increased with
moving speed of nodes and transmission range.
Moving Speed = C3 ∗ NE (6)
NE = C4 ∗ Transmission Range (7)
Where C3 and C4 are constants, which depends on multiple factors. When node move fast it will encounter (Contact) with
more node. If Transmission Range (TR) of nodes is large it will encounter with more number of nodes, Which is prove
in simulation. Furthermore, PL is inversely related to Transmission Speed/Moving Speed (TS) and TR. Figs 6 and 7 show
simulation results of packet delivery ratio and packet loss ratio with TS and TR.
Fig. 6. Impact of transmission range on packet delivery and packet loss ratio
Fig. 7. Impact of moving speed of nodes on packet delivery and packet loss ratio
NE is also related to Wait Time (WT) that affect DR and PL.
NE = C5/WT (8)
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DR = C6/WT (9)
PL = C7 ∗ WT (10)
Where C5, C6 and C7 are constants. Figs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 shows impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss
with epidemic, First Contact, Direct Delivery, SprayAndWait and PROPHET respectively. Which is prove of the claims.
Fig. 8. Impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss with Epidemic
Fig. 9. Impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss with First Contact
Fig 13 shows the impact of WT on NE in Epidemic routing. For illustration, this article only shows performance of Epidemic
routing, and all other routing protocols discussed earlier show same type results. It is clear from results that WT is increased
with the decrease in NE. This ultimately leads to decreased packet delivery ratio and increased Packet loss ratio.
As mentioned earlier in this article AP is directly related to algorithm design (time and space complexity) and node Buffer
Size (BS).
AP = (AD ∗ BS)K3 (11)
Where K3 is a constant of proportionality that depends on connectivity.
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Fig. 10. Impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss with Direct Delivery
Fig. 11. Impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss with SprayAndWait
According to Eq. 11 AP directly depends on AD, BS and K3, where K3 is connectivity constant. If there is no connectivity,
K3 becomes zero, so Performance = 0. Algorithm with minimum time and space complexity gives better performance. But
on the other hand, the performance also depends on node buffer size. In order to calculate performance, put Eq. 11 in Eq. 2,
we get
Performance-A = (AD ∗ BS ∗ K1 ∗ K3)/BC (12)
Eq. 12 clearly shows that performance directly depends on AD, BS, K1, and K3. Performance will be zero if one of the
constant becomes zero. Moreover, BC has a indirect impact on performance. Too large value can degrade the performance,
while with small value the performance will increase by keeping other parameters constant. By putting the value of Eq. 3 in
Eq. 12, we get
Performance-A = (AD ∗ K1 ∗ K3 ∗ (DR ∗ K2)/PL)/BC (13)
Eq. 13 shows that performance is not only directly related to DR, but proportional to the ratio of K2 times DR to PL. This
result in high delivery and low packet loss ratios.
The performance also depends on Detection Accuracy (DA). This is related to Inter-Contact Time (ICT) and Number of
Nodes (NNodes) in a network. The DA is inversely related to ICT (nodes that meet after long time) and directly proportional
to NNodes [133]. Consider an attack scenario based on rate limit and encounter system, misbehaving nodes are not detected
until other nodes meet. If nodes meet frequently, this means short ICT and result in high detection probability otherwise low.
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Fig. 12. Impact of wait time on packet delivery and packet loss with PROPHET
Fig. 13. Impact of wait time on number of Encounter (Contacts)
However, if the ratio of NNodes is high, then detection probability is high by keeping other parameters constant. We define
the Detection Accuracy (DA)
DA = K4(NNodes/ICT) (14)
Where K4 is a constant of proportionality depending on mobility strategy and scenario. As mentioned earlier that performance
is directly related to DA and it depends on other factors as well which are previously discussed.
Performance-B = K5 ∗ DA (15)
Where K5 is a constant which depends on other factors mentioned earlier. Putting the value of Eq. 14 in Eq. 15 we get
Performance-B = K5 ∗ K4(NNodes/ICT) (16)
Eq. 16 shows that performance is directly related to NNodes and inversely related to ICT. If the number of malicious nodes
are high, so detection probability will be high. Moreover, if ICT is short so detection probability is high, and results in high
performance.
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As already discussed, the performance of detection algorithms depends on cost as well. According to Eq. 1, Cost is equal
to the sum of Processing Cost and Extra Node Cost. Some of the previously discussed proposed algorithms are costly due to
processing and extra node for detection [135], [160], [185].
Performance-C = 1/(K6 ∗ Cost) (17)
where K6 is constant. By keeping all other parameters constant put Eq. 1 in Eq. 17 we get
Performance-C = 1/(K6(Processing Cost + Extra Node Cost)) (18)
Eq. 18 shows inverse relationship. As mentioned earlier in this article Some proposed algorithms used extra node for
detection such as Watch-Dog and Guard-Node. In Some proposed algorithms, extra node move along packets. On the other
hand processing cost is also important parameter for performance evaluation. Some proposed algorithms use simple methods
to detect misbehaving node while others used complex methods. For example, rate limit based scheme only make P-claim
and T-claim and forward along with a packet, then cross check the packet which is computational overhead. Merkle-hash tree
based scheme calculate hash and append with a packet, receiver side verify hash value. In some proposed schemes, reputation
is calculated while few used encounter history. Node shares encounter history with other and all receiving nodes verify it.
Battery usage of some algorithms is high. Based on these observations, every scheme have various processing cost. If cost is
low, performance will be good. However, in literature researchers do not show processing cost in simulation graph, which is
very difficult to predict. That is why measurement of processing cost is out of the scope of this article.
VII. USE CASES
As a use case impact of flood attacks i.e. SSSD, SSMD, MSSD and MSMD (which is already define an attacks Taxonomy
in section II of this article), on packet delivery and packet loss ratios is evaluated.
A. Simulation Setup
The simulation is performed using ONE [197] simulator with parameters summarized in Table VII. We consider two scenarios
for each approach: Epidemic With Normal nodes (EN), Epidemic With Malicious nodes (EM), First Contact With Normal nodes
(FN), First Contact With Malicious nodes (FM), Direct Delivery With Normal nodes (DN), Direct Delivery With Malicious
nodes (DM), SprayAndWait With Normal nodes (SN) and SprayAndWait With Malicious node (SM). The ratio of message
creation between malicious and normal node is 4:1. The simulation takes one legitimate node and one malicious node in case
of SSSD; one malicious and four legitimate nodes in case of SSMD; four malicious and one legitimate nodes in case of MSSD;
four malicious and eight legitimate nodes in case of MSMD.
TABLE VII
SIMULATION PARAMETERS LIST
Parameter Assign Value Parameter Assign Value
Movement Model RandomWayPoint TTL 300
Area 500*500 Group 2
Buffer Size 5 MB Wait Time 0, 120
Bandwidth 2 Mbs Update intervel 0.1
Nodes Mobile Router Epidemic
Moving speed 1, 1.6 Router First Contact
Transmit Range 10 M Router SprayAndWait
Simulation Time 50000 Router Direct Delivery
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): It is the ratio between delivered packets to total created Packets.
PDR = Delivered Packets (DP)/Total Created Packets (CP) (19)
Packet Loss Ratio (PLR): It is the number of packets drop during communication.
PLR = (CP − DP)/CP (20)
This article took percent value of PDR and PLR. Add Eq. 19 with Eq. 20 we get.
PDR + PLR = (DP/CP) + (CP − DP)/CP (21)
PDR + PLR = (DP + CP − DP)/CP (22)
PDR + PLR = 1 (23)
Eq. 23 implies the Sum of PDR and PLR is always be 1. This also imply that sum of percent value of PDR and PLR always
be 100.
Buffer Consumption: It is the total buffer consumed in simulation. Buffer Consumption (BC), Total Buffer (TB) and Unused
Buffer (UB)
BC = (TB - UB) (24)
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B. Use Case 1
This concerns when malicious nodes only forward packets and legitimate node only receive packets. Result shows that due
to flood attacks, the packet delivery ratio is decreased and packet loss ratio is increased under evaluated routing protocol. Fig
14 shows packet delivery and packet loss ratios of SSSD, SSMD, MSSD and MSMD attacks, which is already defined in
attacks Taxonomy Section II of this article. where results show that almost 29 percent of packet delivery ratio is decreased and
packet loss ratio is increased in SSSD flood attacks. Moreover, SSSD attacks have almost same effect on all routing protocols.
Fig. 14. Impact of Malicious node on PDR and PLR
Simulation results of SSMD flood attacks shows that due to flood attacks, 39 to 54 percent packet delivery ratio is decreased,
and packet loss ratio is increased. According to results, Epidemic, First Contact and SprayAndWait shows Similar results, which
is more than SSSD attacks. Because single target multiple nodes, which consumed resources of multiple nodes. Direct Delivery
protocol is less effected because it deliver packet directly to destination, which consumed less buffer. It is very clear from
simulation graph that in case of epidemic and SprayAndWait approximately 53 percent decreased in packet delivery ratio.
Simulation graph shows that in case of First contact delivery ratio is decreased almost 52 percent. Simulation graph of direct
delivery shows approximately 39 percent decreased in packet delivery ratios and increased in packet loss ratios, when malicious
nodes launches attacks.
Simulation results of MSSD flood attacks show that flood attacks has 33 to 40 percent decreased in packet delivery and loss
ratios. Which is less than SSMD and more than SSSD. Because in this type of attacks multiple source target one node, which
consumed the resources of that single node. The effect of MSSD flood attacks is almost the same in all discussed routing
protocols except First Contact which is 33 percent.
It is very clear from simulation graph that packet delivery ratio is decreased and packet loss ratios is increased in case of
MSMD flood attacks. Simulation graph shows that there are approximately 1 to 16 percent decreased in packet delivery ratio.
Simulation results of First Contact shows negligible effect of flood attacks on packet delivery ratio and packet loss ratios.
Due to flood attacks, the buffer is consumed and ultimately causes packet delivery ratio and packet loss ratio problems.
This article simulates all mentioned above attacks to calculate buffer consumption in case of flood attacks. Every node have
5M buffer initially. For illustration purpose, this article calculates buffer consumption on specific time of the simulation that
is 4100 seconds. This article test multiple routing protocol, However it shows approximately similar results. That is why for
illustration this article simulates buffer consumption for Epidemic Router. Fig 15 show simulation results of used buffer space
in case of SSSD, SSMD, MSSD and MSSD. The horizontal side of the graph represents different nodes, and the vertical side
represents the used buffer in Bytes. In horizontal side node are given specific id. That is S0, S1, S2, S3, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5,
R6, R7 and R8.
Simulation result of SSSD shows that there are clear buffer consumption when malicious nodes launches attacks. Simulation
results shows that extra buffer consumption (Buffer Consumption Under Flood Attacks - Buffer Consumption without Flood
Attacks) due to attack of one node is almost 3100000 and other node is 2820000 bytes.
Simulation results of SSMD shows that there are buffer consumption in the range of 1.9 to 3.2 MB when malicious node
launches flood attacks. Extra buffer consumption of nodes is 300000, 1960000, 2600000, 2300000, and 3020000 bytes due to
attack. Due to this buffer consumption packet delivery ratio is decreased and packet loss ratio is increased.
Simulation results of MSSD shows that extra buffer consumption of nodes in range of 1.8 to 3.4 MB approximately. In case
of attack extra buffer consumption of nodes in MSSD is 2680000, 324000, 3040000, 2920000 and 1840000 bytes.
Simulation results shows that there are buffer consumption in case of MSMD as well, when malicious nodes launches
flood attacks. It is clear from simulation graph that there are extra buffer consumption in MSMD are 120000, 2000000, -
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Fig. 15. Impact of Flood attacks on Buffer Consumption
1020000, 1740000, -300000, 2620000, 1380000, 2660000 1980000, 2580000, 2120000 and 3120000 bytes approximately of
various nodes. Buffer consumption are less in this case relative to other attacks. Because in this case number of node are
more than other attacks. Which imply buffer consumption are less relative to other. It is clear from simulation graph that
S2 and R1 consumed less buffer (negative value means under flood attacks extra buffer consumption is smaller than extra
buffer consumption without flood attacks.) under flood attacks. This is because of the fact, nodes are mobile in DTNs. Buffer
consumption is minimum due to less encounter in simulation (Number of Encounter of R1 is minimum in this case). If number
of encounter is minimum so it will consumed minimum buffer. Which is already prove in mathematical section of this article
that is why buffer consumption of R1 is negative (If we subtract greater value from smaller it gives negative number). Also
S2 are malicious forwarder which forward more packets to other nodes, which down innocent nodes. That is why innocent
nodes are not able to forward messages to S2, so extra buffer consumption of S2 is minimum under flood attacks which is
shown by negative sign with bytes.
C. Use Case 2
When malicious and legitimate nodes receive and forward packets at the same time, Fig 16 show packet delivery and packet
loss ratios of SSSD, SSMD, MSSD and MSMD. Simulation results of all protocol shows almost same results. It is very clear
from simulation results that there are approximately 31 percent packet delivery ratio is decreased and packet loss ratio is
increased.
Fig. 16. Impact of Malicious node on PDR and PLR
In SSMD flood attacks, packet delivery ratios is decreased when malicious nodes launches flood attacks. It is very clear from
simulation graph that in Direct Delivery almost 58 percent decreased in packet delivery ratio and packet loss ratio. Simulation
graph of Epidemic and SprayAndWait shows that there are almost 57 percent decreased in packet delivery ratio and packet
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loss ratio, when malicious nodes are deployed. Simulation results of First Contact shows that there are 37 percent decreased
in packet delivery ratio when malicious nodes launches flood attacks.
In case of MSSD flood attacks, it is very clear from all the graph of simulation that due to malicious nodes packet delivery
ratio is decreased and packet loss ratio is increased. Simulation result shows that in case of Epidemic, Direct Delivery and
SprayAndWait packet delivery ratio is decreased 33 to 36 percent approximately. Simulation graph shows that in case of First
Contact packet delivery ratio is decreased 31 percent.
Quantitative analysis of MSMD shows that there are approximately 17 percent decreased in packet delivery ratios, when
Epidemic and Direct Delivery routing protocol are used. It is clear from the graph of First Contact and SprayAndWait that
there are almost 3 to 6 percent decreased in packet delivery ratios when malicious nodes launches flood attacks.
Summary of Simulation Results:
This article take 2 cases with 4 different strategy to launch flood attacks and shows its impact on PDR, PLR and buffer
consumption. Simulation is carried out on Epidemic, First Contact, SprayAndWait, Prophet and Direct Delivery. Simulation
results shows all the protocol are effected due to flood attacks. From above results this article concluded that packet delivery
ratio is decreased and packet loss ratio is increased when malicious nodes launches attacks. Delivery ratio of First Contact
are less effected and Epidemic are mostly effected due to malicious nodes attacks. This is because of Epidemic forward more
packet which consumed more buffer and First Contact only forward message to one node. Which consumed less buffer. Direct
Delivery are also less effected like First Contact because it forward packet directly to destination, which consumed less buffer.
Researchers proposed Epidemic and SprayAndWait for improvement in delivery ratio and packet loss ratio. However, in case of
malicious nodes presence, Epidemic and SprayAndWait are mostly effected. Because Epidemic forward more packet to all its
surrounding nodes, which consumed more buffer. Like Epidemic SprayAndWait Spray packets then wait for certain time which
also consumed more buffer of nodes. Which ultimately cause packet delivery ratios are decreased in presence of malicious
nodes. For normal situation when there is no malicious nodes Epidemic and SprayAndWait are best for best packet delivery
ratios. However, in case of malicious nodes presence Epidemic and SprayAndWait are worst choice. Unlike Epidemic and
SprayAndWait First contact forward message to only First contacted node. And Direct Delivery forward directly to destination.
Which inherently stop number of messages. That is why buffer are less consumed which enhance packet delivery ratios and
packet loss ratios.
Simulation results of use Case 1 and use Case 2 shows that delivery ratio is a little bit high in case of use Case 2. Because
in use Case 2 malicious node send and receive packets at same time. Packet delivery ratios of use Case 2 is improve due to
malicious node also receive packet which is added in delivery ratios.
VIII. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
The following are the open research issues in the broad area of security in DTNs, and misbehaving nodes particularly.
A. Detection Time
The proposed algorithms in literature that detect malicious node, normally suffered from delays and long duration in
the detection. Rate limit based algorithms detect malicious nodes with cross checking strategies. However, due to frequent
disconnection, the encounter of nodes will take significant time, and thus consume resources that ultimately causes packet
delivery and packet loss ratio problems. As rate limit based algorithms and encounter based algorithms share history information,
this takes long time to detect malicious nodes. Therefore, efficient detection time is an open research issue. Moreover, most
of the rate limit based detection algorithms have not been with the ability to detect the colluding attacks.
B. Trade-off Between Centralized and Distributed Manners
Guard Node Based Detection is not suitable for DTNs environment, as all traffic will pass through central node. In Mobile
Guard Node Based Detection, only one mobile guard node will allow every packets to pass through. As such, there is a need
to see the trade-off between centralized and distributed based detection solutions.
C. Personalized Based Reputation Detection
Reputation based detection is also not very suitable like guard node based detection. This is because in former, there are
two choices to calculate reputation of nodes i.e. by TA or from Acknowledgment. Both type of detection need end-to-end
connectivity, and therefore Personalized Reputation based detection is an open issue.
D. Third Party Trusted Platform
In the credit based detection, either source or destination node gives credit. This process also incurs complex calculation,
and causes overused battery and other resources. Moreover, both models may be biased in some use cases. Therefore, trusted
third party platform is required to overcome the issue of misuse of trust, and also save energy resources of node for calculation.
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E. Insider Attack
The proposed work in literature deployed detection scheme in Bundle Security Protocol. This deployment stops outside
attacks but to provides prevention from insider attacker nodes. Therefore, it is important issue to design algorithms that
provide safeguard against inside attacker nodes.
F. Extra Information
Some of detection solutions forward extra information along with packets to detect and mitigate attacker nodes, e.g., rate
limit based detection forwards packet claim along with packet, and encounter based detection forwards history information.
Merkle hash tree based detection forwards hashes along with packets. These extra information consume buffer and bandwidth,
and thus causes degrades delivery ratio and packet loss ratio.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This article focused on misbehaving nodes in DTNs that launch various attacks and degrade network performance. The
misbehaving nodes whether are malicious or selfish, often launch various attacks that mainly drop legitimate packets or
inject fake packets to disrupt the network operations. We surveyed a large number of recent publications, and accomplished
a comparison, given the characteristics of the reviewed detection algorithms based on our taxonomy. We further concluded
performance analysis that misbehaving nodes launch attacks to decrease packet delivery ratio and throughput, increase packet
loss ratio, overuse scarce resources, create nodes unavailability and disseminate bogus packets. Based on the study of this
article we concluded that Rate limit and Encounter based Algorithms are best relative to other in flood mitigation, Due to
its suitability in DTNs. Because Rate limit based and Encounter based algorithms have TA, easily deployed in DTNs and
Distributed (In which more than one node is responsible for detection, unlike Centralized based algorithm in which one
node is responsible for detection). In Centralized based algorithms false positive and false negative ratio are high relative
to Distributed algorithms. Reputation based algorithms are not bad choice in mitigation of packet drop attacks. Credit based
algorithms have more false positive and false negative ratio due to Message-Purse-Model and Message-Trade-Model. This
article proposed TA-Trad-Model which possibly overcomes the above issues. Watch-Dog and Gate-Way-Node based schemes
are not suitable in DTNs. Merkle-hash-Tree based schemes are best choice for mitigation of Fake packet attacks, if some
modification are applied in existing algorithms. Protocol based algorithms are cheapest solution for mitigation of Flood attacks
with modification for internal malicious nodes detection as well. We further concluded from the simulation results of use cases,
that Epidemic and SprayAndWait are not good choice in presence of malicious nodes. First Contact forward less number of
packets relative to Epidemic and SprayAndWait. First Contact algorithm do not allowed malicious nodes (Algorithm create
barrier for node to forward more packets. Algorithm only allowed forward packet to first contacted node.) to forward large
number of packets. Which ultimately consumed less buffer relative to Epidemic and SprayAndWait, which enhanced packet
delivery ratio and packet loss ratio. So in presence of malicious node First Contact is best choice for packet delivery ratios.
We hope this article would further motivate the research interest in security related topics in DTNs, and accordingly highlight
the following directions for future investigations:
1) Hybrid, efficient and distributed algorithms to detect and mitigate flood, packet drop and fake packet attacks.
2) Scalable assumptions of constants terms in analysis to find relationship between parameters in addition to buffer and
bandwidth consumption.
3) Preventive based algorithm to thwart malicious nodes, that overuse limited resources.
4) Detection of malicious packet rather than malicious nodes.
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